Abstract-Electronic voting is one of important applications in security protocols. Now most of existing voting schemes are mainly for election in which each voter has only one ballot. However, there are cases in which each voter has multi ballots. In this paper we present a new voting scheme in which each voter has multiple ballots and votes for multiple candidates. In this scheme the voter simply picks up candidates and posts a single encrypted message. In this proposal we use the anonymous distribution of secret information so that no one knows which information is being passed to whom.
INTRODUCTION
Electronic voting is one of important applications in security protocols. We hope that electronic voting is as secure and efficient as traditional voting system. It needs to achieve privacy, anonymous, universal verifiability, and robustness. Many electronic voting schemes have been proposed. But most of those voting schemes are mainly for election in which each voter has only one ballot. However, there are cases in which each voter has multi ballots [1] , [2] . In this paper we present a new voting scheme in which each voter has multiple ballots and votes for multiple candidates. In this scheme the voter simply picks up candidate and posts a single encrypted message. It is very simple scheme and we can cut down cost for voting system and amount of voters' work. In this scheme we use the anonymous distribution. Anonymous distribution is the distribution of secret information so that no one knows which information is being passed to whom.
II. RELATED WORK
Many electronic voting schemes have been proposed. They are classified below.
A. Shuffle
These schemes use anonymous channel such as Mix-net [3] , [4] . Mix-net is servers for shuffle. Mix-net shuffles ballots and realize anonymous and privacy. Anonymity is kept unless all servers conspire. Mix-net is the basic technique for transmitting ballots, and is used combining other technology [5] - [9] .
B. Blind Signature
With Mix-net we can realize anonymous but double vote cannot be checked. Using Blind-signature [10] - [13] , voter are only once allowed vote. All voters request a blind-signature from an authority to permit voting. Voters can get his ballot signed by an authority but authority cannot see the contents of vote. This scheme needs anonymous channel like Mix-net.
C. Homomorphism based schemes
Homomorphism based schemes [14] - [20] use homomorphic encrypt function and require ZKIPs to prove that each voting action is fair. All voters need high cost to compute and communication with servers. However tallying servers can get result with low cost to tally ballots.
III. OUR GOAL
We propose new multi-ballots election scheme using anonymous distribution. Most of voting schemes mentioned above are mainly for election in which each voter has only one ballot. However, there are cases in which each voter has multi ballots. Using these schemes for multi-ballots all voters need multi action to vote. It is not efficient.
Our proposed scheme is simple. All voters can vote with only one action for multi-ballot. And this scheme keeps anonymous, privacy, universal verifiability.
IV. ANONYMOUS DISTRIBUTION
We use anonymous distribution. Anonymous distribution is the distribution of secret information so that no one knows which information is being passed to whom. Anonymous distribution can be used for electronic voting scheme [21] .
We can realize anonymous distribution easily. We write a secret different value one by one in CD-ROM. We do not attach a label to CD-ROM. We mix these CD-ROMs carefully. After all we cannot know which information is written in which CD-ROM.
We can do anonymous distribution using e-mail [22] .This scheme is anonymous distribution method by the trusted third party. A receiving person can participate with the public key and private key always used and does not need to participate in 978-1-4244-6890-4/10$26.00 ©2010 IEEE TENCON 2010distribution work, and can receive distribution simply. Since danger is divided, the trusted third party can be divided into an arbitrary number. The reliability is maintained unless almost all organizations conspire and do injustice.
V. HOW TO VOTE
Voting system consist of entities below.
• Voters
We use V i to denote voters who are permitted to vote. {V 1 ,V 2 ,…,V N } are the set of voters. And all voters can vote m i ballots for M candidates.
• Candidates
In this scheme we can have multi-candidates for vote. We use { C 1 , C 2 ,…, C M } to denote candidates.
• Election Administration Committee
In this scheme, Election Administration Committee bears an important role. EAC (Election Administration Committee) make vote cards and keep them secret till the deadline of an election. And for tallying votes, EAC make votes cards public and count ballots. Basically EAC is trusted third party but we assume EAC may perform injustice.
• Anonymous Distribution System Anonymous Distribution System distributes vote cards which EAC made. They may consist of two or more organizations. They distribute secret information so that no one knows which information is being passed to whom. In this paper we will not refer to how to consist of this distribution system in detail.
• Mix-net
We use Mix-net as an anonymous channel. Voters send vote cards and Mix-net makes them anonymous. Mix-net may consist two or more servers and we assume all voters can get their public keys and connect to them. In this paper we will not refer to how to constitute Mix-net in detail.
• Tally up Facility TF(Tally up Facility) collects ballots from Mix-net and keep them secret till the deadline of an election. At the time of count of the votes, TF calculate. Their calculation result is exhibited to public using a bulletin board. Basically TF is trusted third party but we assume TF may perform injustice. But we do not assume that EAC and TF conspire. TL need homomorphic public encrypt function E and keep the public key open for all parties.
• BBS BBS(bulletin board system) is used as a public communication for any party. But each legitimate party can write message only on its designated timing. Nobody can erase any messages from BBS. 
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We describe an actual voting method below. Since we are afraid that it is hard to understand, so we also describes the easy example in the following chapter. (2) Anonymous distribution EAC distribute vote cards for voters using anonymous distribution system. No one can know which vote card is being passed to whom. He make those products of prime value he picked up and encrypt it with TL's public key and send E(B kl *B k'l' …) to Mix-net.
(4) TL's action TL get encrypted vote cards from Mix-net. TL calculates TT which is total products of vote cards.
If TL get E(B ij ) , TL make
We can make TL consist of two or more facilities and encrypt function E can also be made composition of two or more functions. So TL cannot decrypt them by oneself till the deadline of an election.
Even if TL should decrypt it before the deadline of an election, TL can get the plain value of TT. But TL can not understand what the plain value means. Because TL can not factor the value which is a product of big prime. Even if TL should factor it, but TL cannot know which candidate each prime factor is corresponding to. To do so, TL needs to conspire with EAC.
(5) Tally up ballots
If a vote period expires, TL counts a vote. TL decrypts TT and makes it public on BBS. And EAC make all vote cards he made public on BBS.
We can factor TT using prime value easily on BBS which EAC used for vote cards.
So we can get TT= B ab *B cd *… and count a vote for candidate corresponding for each B ij with reference to vote cards EAC made on BBS.
Anyone can do this calculation because all value is on BBS. This contributes to universal verifiability.
VI. EXAMPLE
We describe an easy example. This example is only for understanding, so in this example we use small prime but actually we use sufficiently big prime in this system. And we can check whether two ballots in same one vote catd are voted and any other prime value is voted.
VII. SECURITY
All voters need to be authenticated when he send his ballot using Mix-net, so voters cannot do double vote because every voter can connect to Mix-net only once. And anyone without a right cannot participate in vote. If TL is injustice and is going to make and change TT so that the candidate whom TL aids can win, he cannot change TT because other prime number corresponding to the candidate which is made and is kept secret by EAC and TL cannot know them.
Fairness is protected similarly. We know TT which TL has is product of prime but we cannot factor it. If we should factor it , we cannot know which candidate each prime is corresponding to with a help of EAC. After the deadline of election, we can factor and count it.
Anonymous and privacy is kept by anonymous distribution and Mix-net. We can make it safer increasingly by making a related server increase.
We maintain universal verifiability using BBS. Anyone can check the calculation for tallying up ballots because in all the calculation, we use the value which is public on BBS.
If EAC is injustice, he can change vote cards he made. For example he can exchange prime value B a in some vote card corresponding to Mr.A and value B b corresponding to Mr.B. After some voter want to vote for Mr.A and send prime value B a to Mix-net, EAC exchange two values and make it public on BBS. So we will count up for Mr.B with value B a which was originally for Mr.A is now for Mr.B.
To avoid this attack we need to get hush value of all vote cards with corresponding to candidates before start of election. If EAC want to change any values in vote cards , anyone can notice it easily. Because anyone can make hush value of vote cards on public BBS and any voter can make hush value of his vote cards. If value of hush is not same, we can suspect EAC.
And in this scheme we can make it possible to offer receiptfree. To do so , we keep prime value secret for each voter. Voters need not to know real prime value. We use homomorphic function F which is encrypt function of third party, and now we replace each B xx in our scheme with F(B xx ) in all vote cards. Each voter see F(B xx ) but he cannot know and need to know B xx . He send E(F(B xx )) to Mix-net. EAC and TL decrypt F and make only B xx public on BBS. So voters cannot claim that the value on BBS is result of his vote because he cannot know original B xx .
VIII. CONCLUSION
We proposed new multi-ballots election scheme using anonymous distribution. It is very simple scheme and we can maintain anonymous, privacy, universal verifiability, fairness, and receipt-free.
